By R. Sasankan
India’s public sector is a monolith and, over the years, many
politicians have dreamed of reshaping and remoulding this giant edifice.
Very few have worked up the courage to undertake such a daunting
enterprise. A few have attempted piecemeal reforms but these have never
yielded great results. But ideas abound – and many of these have
coagulated into noble intentions that have found expression in the
annual budget speeches, without setting explicit targets or time frames
to fulfil these objectives.
Way back in the 1980s, the finance minister of the Congress government
announced a policy decision to close down all sick Public Sector
Undertakings (PSUs). Six months after the announcement, I had visited
Udyog Bhavan, which houses the ministry of heavy industry, to find out
how much progress had been made on this laudable proposal. A South
Indian bureaucrat, who had a great sense of humour, smiled at me and
sarcastically commented: “Do you think this proposal will ever work? In
independent India, only one public sector has so far been closed down
and that was the Banana Corporation of India which had only three
employees.” The bureaucrat knew how the system worked and his cynicism
was justified. But politicians have their own compulsions to spin big
dreams – and have continued to do so. The Congress was succeeded by the
National Front, the UPA and the NDA. None has had the courage to close
down any loss-making PSU so far.
The Modi government had named Arun Jaitley as the finance minister
during its first term in office. Jaitley had always enjoyed a good
equation with the Prime Minister and had the political stature to
implement even difficult decisions. In one of his budget speeches, he
announced the government’s intention to merge the oil and gas PSUs to
create a corporate giant. Consultants were brought in to assist the
bureaucrats in working out the plan. His intention was not merely to
bridge the fiscal deficit but to reshape the oil sector, which had too
many bit players. The basic assumption that underpinned this objective
was simple: India was a large country and, therefore, it needed large
corporations, not small and fragmented entities.
Jaitley wrestled with the idea during his five-year tenure but succeeded
only in persuading the upstream major Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
(ONGC) to acquire the government stake in downstream major, Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL). The ONGC management was reluctant but
did not have the courage to oppose it. Petroleum minister Dharmendra
Pradhan was very close to Jaitley and could not, therefore, oppose it
either. The proceeds from the sale of the government stake in HPCL
helped Jaitley bridge a widening fiscal deficit -- a grander version of
the device that Dr Vijay Kelkar employed when he was finance secretary
in 1998. It is a different matter that ONGC could have gainfully used
the money to acquire oil and gas assets overseas.
Jaitley’s successor, Nirmala Sitharaman, did not show much interest
initially in pursuing her predecessor’s goals and the plan looked as
good as dead and buried. But it has popped up once again in her latest
budget speech where she has spoken about consolidating the PSUs and, in
the process, even privatising some of them. This is an even grander
objective that the one Jaitley had envisioned.
True, there is a crying need to create genuine competition in the oil
and gas sector. Multiple oil and gas PSUs are engaged in
pseudo-competition that has given rise to inefficiencies that the
consumer is being forced to pay for. The primary focus of oil marketing
companies (OMCs) has been on building more outlets to grab market share
at a huge cost, even though they were all owned by the Government of
India.
This has led to poor outcomes: the OMCs have been allocating large
capital outlays to build more outlets while sales per outlet have been
falling over the years. In the upstream sector, there is no earthly
reason why we should have two companies in operation when the
prospectivity of the Indian sedimentary basin has been poor. We have had
no major oil find since Bombay High and the cost of lifting every
barrel has been steadily increasing. To make things worse, the Chinese
walls have been broken with downstream companies trying to swim upstream
and vice versa at very significant costs.
The idea of selling some PSUs to private players also makes little
sense. After all, you can never get the true replacement value of assets
on the ground. What you will get is the value for the cash flow that
the PSU was generating and this would be sub-optimal because of the
current structure of the industry.
Any meaningful reform in the downstream sector is not possible without
competition. This is possible only if a global oil major enters the
Indian market to compete with the PSU oil marketing companies. It is not
going to be easy for any private player, however powerful and
resourceful, to compete in India’s retailing market without a share in
the marketing infrastructure which is virtually monopolised by the PSU
oil marketing companies. Viewed against this background, the move to
privatise Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL) makes sense. It should
not be a distress sale. The move, however, has run into problems as
divergent interests pull in different directions, with no one having the
power or influence to scuttle the plan.
Sitharaman has come up with an ambitious, overarching plan that seeks to
consolidate entities across the public sector: the template covers oil
companies, banks, insurance firms et al. Oil experts, however, feel that
any plan to consolidate the petroleum sector should not nibble away at
the integrated structure that has been in place since the 1960s.
The oil sector has three clearly demarcated areas: upstream, downstream
and mid-stream. The PSU upstream players are ONGC and Oil India,
downstream companies are IOC, BPCL and HPCL, and the solitary player in
midstream is GAIL India Ltd. E&P players -- ONGC and Oil India --
can be merged into one upstream major. Though both are saddled with
aging fields and stagnating production, their merger makes eminent sense
unlike the earlier move to merge Oil India with IOC, which was a
proposal mooted by a consultant hired during Jaitley’s tenure. This
obviously means that HPCL --which was foisted on ONGC -- will have to be
delinked. The same logic will apply to Mangalore Refineries and
Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL) which ONGC acquired for want of success in
E&P. Both these companies should join the downstream giant that will
emerge, which can be none other than an expansive Indian Oil
Corporation (IOC).
BPCL has already been earmarked for privatisation. The entry of RIL and
Nayara made no difference to the plight of the Indian consumer who was
denied quality fuels. In the midstream, GAIL is both transporter and
marketer of gas, an “irreverent combination” that is sought to be undone
by bifurcating it into two companies. The transportation business
should obviously remain in the public sector.
According to experts, this structure is the most suitable for India and
not the so-called integrated companies with upstream and downstream
operations being merged under a unified management. In such a scenario,
the role of Shastri Bhavan, which houses the petroleum ministry, will be
severely curtailed. The petroleum minister, who is answerable to
parliament, will however continue to oversee the entire oil sector.
That brings us to the more contentious issue of regulation. It is
evident that the upstream Exploration and Production (E&P) sector
should have an independent regulator. The present Directorate General of
Hydrocarbons (DGH) – which masquerades as a high-sounding independent
regulator – is actually a toothless tiger and operates as a wing of the
petroleum ministry without any decision-making powers whatsoever.
The present downstream regulatory setup should be smashed and
reconceived. The Downstream Regulatory Act, whose many provisions had
been struck down by courts, should be re-drafted with the help of
experts. The government should stop the practice of appointing
superannuated bureaucrats as the regulator. None of the worthies
appointed till date has had any impact on the industry. And there is no
doubt that the mid-stream operations of a badly divided GAIL should be
brought under the control of the regulator.
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