by R. Sasankan
When US President Donald Trump started to weaponize tariffs as part of a grand design to reignite the engines of American growth in the belief that he could claw back manufacturing jobs from China, there were many who questioned the need for the tariff tantrum and the ability to enforce these levies in a modern global economy.
But Trump has not been the first US president to go down this road.
America's tryst with tariffs dates back to 1789 when George Washington signed the Tariff of 1789 which was explicitly designed to restrict British imports and build young America's manufacturing sectors. President William McKinley championed the McKinley Tariff of 1890, using high rates aggressively to protect domestic manufacturing wages from foreign competition.
Another President, Herbert Hoover, signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, raising import duties to record levels to shield American businesses during the Great Depression. This backfired when foreign countries retaliated with their own tariffs, hastening the global economic collapse.
Historically, tariffs served as America's main source of government revenue and a tool for economic leverage long before the modern income tax era. President Richard Nixon imposed a temporary 10% global import surcharge not strictly for long-term protectionism, but as a blunt-force threat to force foreign allies and rivals (like Japan and European nations) to revalue their currencies and renegotiate global monetary rules.
Still, Donald Trump is a lot different from his predecessors both as a person and as US president. Trumpian tariff threats break from past US history by shifting from narrow economic or revenue tools into blunt, universal instruments of geopolitical coercion. While historical tariffs aimed to protect specific domestic industries or raise federal revenue, Trump uses broad baseline threats against friends and foes alike to force non-trade concessions.
Trump administration's "America First" and reciprocal trade policies, hit a peak in mid-2025 when the US imposed a cumulative 50% tariff on Indian goods. This rate was later reduced to 18% in February 2026 following interim trade talks
The Trump administration's latest provocations and tariff threats centre on a White House report titled "The Great Transshipment Scam," which accuses India-along with over 40 other nations-of serving as a shadow corridor by allowing Chinese exporters to route goods and evade US tariffs. The White House explicitly named India as a Tier 1 trans -shipment risk, alleging that manufacturing hubs are being used to repackage, lightly assemble, or re-label Chinese goods to mask their true origin.
Top US officials and proposed legislation (such as the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act) have leveraged the threat of duties scaling up to 100% or higher over India's continued refusal to halt oil imports from Russia.
Is India's import of Russian crude the real issue or is Trump using it as a weapon to hobble India's fast-growing economy? Russia supplies nearly half of India's total crude imports. Trump and his advisers know that it will not be easy for India to prune price-discounted Russian crude. Cutting Russian imports by half would increase India's annual oil import bill by $5 billion to $10 billion. It would also raise domestic inflation, weaken the rupee, and expand the current account deficit.
What happens if Trump carries out his threat of 100% tariff? I posed this question to a few experts who say a 100% duty would double the cost of Indian goods in the US. This would affect sectors like IT, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and engineering products making them uncompetitive compared to alternative global suppliers.
Public opinion polls show that Donald Trump's approval ratings have tumbled to a record low. Some specific surveys report that his net approval ratings have dropped into negative territory - the recent Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that only 33% approved of his performance while 64% disapproved - while others reveal that 40% of the respondents have labelled him as the worst in US history. Historians generally rank 19th-century figures like James Buchanan and Andrew Johnson at the very bottom in terms of approvals.
India need not get excited over his reported unpopularity. Nor should it bother about the claim that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump are good friends. Personal warmth cannot override Washington's broader strategic sanctions goals. Trump views trade through an "America First" lens, openly accusing India of taking advantage of the U.S. with high historic tariffs.
No one knows what Trump may or may not do. I suspect he does not know which way he will eventually go. The lunges, feints and dramatic turnarounds may be part of a strategy but it has gone on for so long that one must look askance at the coherence of the plan. The Trump Administration is simultaneously working on sanctioning 40 countries for transhipping Chinese goods. India, Canada and Mexico are part of the 40. To counter the tariff threat, India certainly can pursue strategic trade negotiations, diversify global export markets, and strategically balance its domestic agricultural and energy baselines. These are normal options.
My personal hope -- and belief -- is that India will not buckle at the prospect of 100% tariffs!
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